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We examine the resource mobilization efforts undertaken by a social venture to organize the 
2003 Special Olympics World Summer Games and bring about a change in social attitudes 
towards the cause of learning and intellectual disabilities. In contrast to previously advanced 
views of social ventures as powerless actors, we find instead that they are able to leverage the 
visibility afforded by large-scale events to create positions of mutual dependence, which allow 
them to access broad support bases and assert themselves in relationships with external parties. 
Specifically, we find that resource mobilization involves six distinct tactics rooted in the softer 
forms of power, namely, attraction and inducement. The use of these soft-power tactics depends 
upon the social venture’s goal at different moments of the relationship with its partners and the 
level of support available from each external party. Our elaborated theory highlights both the 
role and limitations of soft power in mobilizing resources and managing relationships.
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There are indeed many barriers that still exist and people with a learning disability encounter 
negative attitudes every day. . . . Sport and participation in Special Olympics is a tremendous 
way to break down barriers and to raise awareness of people with a learning disability and to 
bring attention to their ability rather than their disability. It is for this reason and this reason alone 
that the bid to bring the World Games to Ireland was initiated.
—Mary Davis, CEO, Special Olympics Ireland Organizing Committee (2000: 17)
Introduction
In July 1998, it was formally announced that Special Olympics Ireland (SOI) had won the 
bid to organize and hold in Ireland the 2003 World Summer Games (“the Games”) for indi-
viduals with learning and intellectual disabilities. As the opening quotation highlights, SOI 
saw the Games as an opportunity to raise awareness of the cause of learning and intellectual 
disabilities and promote long-term changes in public attitudes. However, the challenges fac-
ing SOI at the outset of its bid were daunting because running the Games successfully 
required obtaining significant resources from a number of external sources. SOI’s access to 
resources was further challenged by limited public awareness of what these disabilities entail 
and what can be perceived in society as a lack of any pressing need to remedy the problems 
of misinformation and unawareness.1
Entities seeking to mobilize resources for social causes frequently face the kind of chal-
lenges that confronted the SOI. While entrepreneurial activities with predominantly social 
objectives can be pursued by a wide variety of entities, including nonprofit organizations, 
for-profit corporations, and governmental organizations, this article focuses on nonprofit 
social ventures (e.g., the SOI). A social venture can be defined as an entity that
targets an unfortunate but stable equilibrium that causes the neglect, marginalization, or suffering 
of a segment of humanity; who brings to bear on this situation his or her inspiration, direct 
action, creativity, courage, and fortitude; and who aims for and ultimately affects the establishment 
of a new stable equilibrium. (R. Martin & Osberg, 2007: 39)
Nonprofits face greater challenges than other entities when advocating for social causes, 
such as a limited access to talent and capital (Austin, Stevenson, & Wei-Skillern, 2006; Di 
Domenico, Tracey, & Haugh, 2009).
Recognition of the enormous challenges faced by these entities in mobilizing the resources 
necessary to pursue the advocacy of their chosen social causes effectively has motivated a 
growing body of academic literature (e.g., Austin et al., 2006; Bennett & Sargeant, 2005; 
Dacin, Dacin, & Matear, 2010; Desa & Basu, 2013; Tilcsik & Marquis, 2013). The studies on 
resource mobilization by social ventures, however, have tended to concentrate on the role of 
resource providers, exploring, for example, why resource providers choose to contribute to a 
given social cause and how their involvement is effectuated (e.g., Bennett & Sargeant; Tilcsik 
& Marquis). In contrast, the role of social ventures in mobilizing resources has received little 
attention despite evidence that these actors can and do take proactive steps to manage their 
resource needs (Desa & Basu; Di Domenico, Haugh, & Tracey, 2010). While Di Domenico 
and colleagues (2009) note that interactions between social ventures and resource providers 
can be tension ridden and lead to conflicts due to differences in priorities and assumptions, 
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there is a dearth of theory on how relationships between social ventures and external partners 
evolve through the course of the resource mobilization process.
The above state of the literature motivates our research question: How do social ventures 
mobilize external resources and how do they manage relationships with their resource pro-
viders? We attempt to generate some answers through a qualitative study of SOI’s efforts to 
mobilize the resources needed to organize the 2003 Games. Our focus on the use of large-
scale events to mobilize resources is timely in light of their growing adoption by social ven-
tures to generate support and visibility for social causes (Tilcsik & Marquis, 2013). Our study 
draws on recent developments in resource dependence theory (e.g., Santos & Eisenhardt, 
2009; Villanueva, Van de Ven, & Sapienza, 2012) and explores how social ventures mobilize 
support for causes despite occupying positions of relative resource disadvantage.
We make three contributions to the literature. First, we provide evidence that despite 
being resource needy, social ventures can create mutual dependence and successfully offer 
their external partners access to valued outcomes. Thus, we urge a shift away from the per-
vasive assumption that social ventures are largely powerless in their relationships with their 
resource providers. In doing so, we echo and qualify recent critiques of the view of resource-
needy organizations as “passive bystanders” (Katila, Rosenberger, & Eisenhardt, 2008: 325; 
also see Di Domenico et al., 2009; Haugh, 2007). When resource mobilization is viewed 
through the lens of mutual dependence, a different narrative emerges that cannot be ade-
quately explained by extant theory. This new narrative draws attention to how social ventures 
actively create conditions of mutual dependence with external parties through organizing 
large-scale events as opposed to merely positioning themselves as recipients of handouts and 
patronage. In our model, social ventures recognize the dynamic nature of relationships with 
external parties and tailor their tactics in accordance with the levels of support received and 
the maturity levels of the relationships in question. While recent studies suggest that “resource 
mobilization may be better explained by the mutual or joint dependence between two parties 
than by the power imbalance in the relationship” (Villanueva et al., 2012: 27; also see Desa 
& Basu, 2013), they do not explain how this might be achieved. Similarly, Barringer and 
Harrison observe that while several studies have focused on “why interorganizational rela-
tionships are formed . . . very little research has focused on how they are managed” (2000: 
396; also see Laplume, Sonpar, & Litz, 2008). We provide one explanation of how social 
ventures might mobilize resources and manage their relationships with their partners.
Second, we make a contribution by drawing attention to the catalytic role that large-scale 
events distinctly embedded in a social venture’s local community play in facilitating mutual 
dependence and mobilizing resources for social causes. This contribution echoes Tilcsik and 
Marquis’s (2013) comment that large-scale events can disrupt the status quo and their con-
cerns with how the overemphasis on globalization has reduced the attention paid to actions 
occurring within local communities. At the same time, we also go beyond their study by 
adopting a social venture–centric approach to generate insights into how large-scale events 
embedded in the local community allow social ventures to engage with multiple external 
parties, transform power relations, foster mass participation, and promote social change. Our 
approach highlights several tactics adopted by social ventures, such as the use of both emo-
tion- and interest-laden appeals and the pursuit of an optimal balance between decentraliza-
tion and centralized control.
Finally, we make a contribution by elaborating the role of “soft power,” which is said to 
entail the use of attraction or inducement (Nye, 1990; Santos & Eisenhardt, 2009) and is the 
McNamara et al. / Social Ventures and Large-Scale Events  473
core logic that facilitates resource mobilization. We propose an elaborated and dynamic the-
ory of resource mobilization that identifies six distinct soft-power tactics employed by social 
ventures contingent upon resource providers’ level of support to the social cause and the 
maturity of the relationship with them. This study’s emphasis on soft power complements 
prior studies that have focused primarily on harsher forms of power, such as force and coer-
cion. While harsher forms of power may not be viable in the context of social ventures, this 
study underlines the role of soft power in enabling positive social outcomes. The dynamic 
resource mobilization model that we propose gains salience in light of observations about 
prior studies offering a static and thereby limited view of the social entrepreneurship process 
(see Hitt, Ireland, Sirmon, & Trahms, 2011). Our study partially addresses calls for future 
studies to explore “issues of resource acquisition, mobilization, and bundling in a social 
entrepreneurial context to gain key insights into the entrepreneurial process” (Dacin et al., 
2010: 50). In effect, we advance resource dependence theory by focusing on the underex-
plored issue of “[which] strategies organizations will use [to acquire and mobilize resources], 
and how the use of these strategies will vary over time and circumstances” (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 2003: xxvi). In the process of doing so, we also highlight the constraints and limita-
tions of soft power in mobilizing resources.
Background on Resource Mobilization by Social Ventures
A crucial, albeit challenging, activity in the process of addressing a social problem is that 
of acquiring the physical, financial, human, and intangible resources required to carry out the 
venture’s mandate (Austin et al., 2006). Evidence on this activity can be found in three con-
versations in the literature that have largely developed independently of each other. In this 
section, we introduce each of them in turn, highlighting their contributions to our understand-
ing of how social ventures acquire resources and noting areas for future elaboration.
Corporate Philanthropy and Cause-Related Marketing
Several studies have documented that corporations often get involved in supporting social 
causes as a way to improve their reputation and legitimacy as a socially responsible entity 
(Muller & Kraussl, 2011; Peloza, 2006; Williams & Barrett, 2000), to appeal to existing and 
prospective customers and employees (Creyer & Ross, 1997; Luo, 2005; Varadarajan & 
Menon, 1988), and to respond to CEOs’ or founders’ specific interests (J. Martin, Knopoff, 
& Beckman, 1998). For volunteers and corporations alike, an esprit de corps, or feeling of 
loyalty, towards their communities often plays a role (Crampton & Patten, 2008; Tilcsik & 
Marquis, 2013). Tilcsik and Marquis, for example, document a marked increase in charitable 
contributions in areas affected by high-impact events, such as natural disasters, and argue 
that this occurs as these events augment the salience of the “local identity” in the eyes of 
corporate donors and, thus, strengthen their ties with the local community.
The involvement of resource providers generally occurs through mechanisms such as 
charitable donations, volunteering, and cause-related marketing (e.g., Creyer & Ross, 1997; 
Lev, Petrovits, & Radhakrishnan, 2010; Varadarajan & Menon, 1988; Williams & Barrett, 
2000). Of these activities, charitable donations and volunteering are considered purely phil-
anthropic in nature. Others, such as cause-related marketing, are generally driven by a 
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combination of philanthropic and commercial motives (Bennett & Sargeant, 2005; 
Varadarajan & Menon). Although each party is fundamentally driven by different base 
motives, these cooperative arrangements provide social entities with the resources they need 
to create social value while also allowing their commercial counterparts to reap benefits 
(Tracey, Philips, & Haugh, 2005).
Bricolage and Communication
Recently, evidence has emerged in various domains about how resource-needy organiza-
tions seek to actively manage and control their resource needs. These studies broadly fall 
within either of two camps. The first camp comprises research that is specifically interested 
in the role of bricolage as a mechanism for resource acquisition. Bricolage is defined here as 
“making do by applying combinations of resources already at hand” (Baker & Nelson, 2005: 
333). In these studies, it is posited that social ventures replace the resources they do not pos-
sess but need to pursue their missions by devising creative uses for “undervalued, slack, or 
discarded resources that are often available for free or cheaply” (Desa & Basu, 2013: 29). 
However, while often ingenious, bricolage is not without limitations since not all resources 
can be bypassed or done away with. Additionally, resorting to bricolage often leads to ven-
tures satisficing as opposed to maximizing (Duymedjian & Rüling, 2010) to achieve their 
goals.
Researchers in the second camp evaluating how entrepreneurial organizations meet their 
resource needs have explored the role of language and communication in facilitating resource 
acquisition (e.g., Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001; Maguire, Hardy, & Lawrence, 2004; Martens, 
Jennings, & Jennings, 2007; Zott & Huy, 2007). These scholars document the use of lan-
guage-based tactics by social ventures, such as storytelling and capitalizing on high-profile 
or celebrity relationships, to establish familiarity and inform prospective partners of track 
records and aspirations. These tactics are especially important for social ventures advocating 
low-profile causes since prospective partners often need and wish to be convinced of the 
“potential usefulness” of the cause that they support (Di Domenico et al., 2010: 697).
The Role of Mutual Dependence
The views of resource mobilization discussed above, although useful, have recently come 
under scrutiny because they underestimate the benefits that accrue to both resource-needy 
organizations and resource providers. Win-win outcomes become possible when the estab-
lished ties are characterized by mutual dependence and lack of vulnerability of either party 
(Gulati & Sytch, 2007; Villanueva et al., 2012). Resource-needy organizations, in particular, 
stand to gain by “creating a platform for joint action” (Parmigiani & River-Santos, 2011: 
1115). Examples of technology ventures collaborating with larger resource-rich partners by 
creating mutual dependence through patents and trade secrets (Katila et al., 2008) are a case 
in point. Mutually dependent relationships allow entrepreneurial ventures to tap a wider 
range of resources under more favorable conditions than do asymmetric relationships 
(Vestrum & Rasmussen, 2013).
Tracey and colleagues ascribe the benefits of mutually dependent relationships to a rebal-
ancing of “power relations [between a focal organization and its resource providers, which] 
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are transformed because partners are seen as sources of valuable assets, knowledge and 
expertise, rather than recipients of patronage or charity” (2005: 327). However, while there 
is growing awareness of the benefits of mutually dependent relationships to resource provid-
ers, relatively little is understood about how social ventures establish, manage, and benefit 
from such relationships (Dacin et al., 2010; Parmigiani & River-Santos, 2011). The argu-
ments made by researchers who urge a focus on mutual dependence are not necessarily 
antagonistic to earlier studies on corporate philanthropy (e.g., Marquis, Glynn, & Davis, 
2007; Tilcsik & Marquis, 2013), which have highlighted the vulnerability of donors and 
sponsors to community demands given that goodwill and reputation could affect future 
revenues.
The recent literature has, on the whole, urged a shift away from a corporate-centric view 
of collaborative relations and expressed concern with the assumption that social ventures are 
powerless entities characterized by one-sided dependence upon external parties. Instead, 
researchers have called for greater attention to the role of mutual dependence and the chang-
ing nature of power relations between social ventures and external parties. Following these 
developments, we pay particular attention to the role of power in its more nuanced and subtle 
forms (Keohane & Nye, 1998; Santos & Eisenhardt, 2009) as an enabler of resource mobili-
zation efforts by social ventures, since the interaction between partners with different inter-
ests is generally shaped by power relationships (Cook & Emerson, 1978; Di Domenico et al., 
2010).
Method
This article draws on a qualitative case study of a social venture’s efforts to establish and 
manage its relationships with various resource providers in the context of organizing a large-
scale event. The aim is theory elaboration, that is, to extend and refine extant understandings 
of resource mobilization by social ventures, rather than theory generation. Theory elabora-
tion “contrasts pre-existing understandings with observed events in order to understand 
extant theory” (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006: 31) and uses a mixture of inductive and deduc-
tive reasoning (also see Lawrence, Malhotra, & Morris, 2012). Qualitative research is par-
ticularly suitable for studying the research question at hand because it allows researchers to 
conduct in-depth investigations into poorly understood phenomena in order to provide richer 
understanding (e.g., Eisenhardt, 1989; Van de Ven, 2007). Additionally, a qualitative approach 
is appropriate for exploring socially grounded phenomena, such as the one examined in this 
study, which involve complex social processes and relationships and offer rich insights into 
how actors’ social experiences are created (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Van de Ven; Yin, 
2003).
Research Context
We have chosen to study the resource mobilization efforts of the SOI, which advocated 
the cause of learning disabilities through organizing the 2003 Games, because several theo-
retical concepts of interest were “transparently observable” (Eisenhardt, 1989: 537) in this 
context (Yin, 2003). First, it was clear from our initial investigations that SOI would have 
forged several relationships with external parties in order to organize the Games successfully, 
since the Irish government had funded only 19% of its budget. Additionally, the SOI was 
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much smaller than the organizations that had hosted similar events in the past. In 1998, the 
year in which the SOI won the bid, it had only eight paid staff, and its annual budget was 
approximately €722,798. The CEO and the chairman of the Games’ organizing committee 
were respectively appointed only in 1999 and 2000.
Second, large events with significant community relevance can serve as powerful tools to 
help introduce changes in attitudes towards social causes (Glynn, 2008). This context there-
fore promised to be a fruitful one for our study. Third, the need for the SOI to establish rela-
tionships with individuals and organizations with frequently opposing interests offers a 
setting in which tensions and reconciliatory efforts are amply visible, thereby affording us a 
greater understanding of how social ventures manage relationships with their resource pro-
viders from the initial sign up until the delivery of the promised resource. Finally, the choice 
of this setting ensured that key occurrences related to our case study were well documented 
and a number of data sources were available to us (Maguire et al., 2004).
Sources of Data
Interviews. The primary source of data was interviews conducted with senior and middle 
managers on the Games’ organizing committee, representatives of corporate entities, pub-
lic-sector and semi-autonomous agencies, and volunteers who had been directly involved 
in the organization and execution of the 2003 Games.2 The first author had been involved 
in some earlier work on learning disabilities with one of SOI’s managers, who facilitated 
access to several early informants. These initial informants identified additional individu-
als, thereby rendering the sampling both deliberate and emergent. This process continued 
until 29 informants had been identified: 14 SOI managers, 9 representatives of corporations, 
4 senior government officials, and 2 volunteers from the community. Six informants were 
interviewed twice, giving a total of 35 interviews. Of these, 15 interviews were conducted in 
2002 and 20 in 2003. The two waves of interviews were comparable in terms of their cover-
age of informants. In addition to these 35 interviews, which were taped and transcribed, 4 
additional interviews were conducted: 1 with an SOI manager, 1 with a volunteer, and 2 with 
representatives of corporations. In these cases, detailed field notes were taken but interviews 
were not recorded. This was due to the informants’ request not to be taped (3 interviews) and 
to a recording malfunction (1 interview).
Interviews were conducted at the informants’ place of work and with an average duration 
of 45 min. They followed a semi-structured format. Interviews with SOI’s managers began 
with a request to talk about their roles and to describe their responsibilities. Informants were 
also asked to talk about the individuals, groups, or organizations with which their depart-
ments interacted and to describe how they had been identified, the opportunities and chal-
lenges these interactions presented, and how the challenges had been addressed. Interviews 
with representatives of corporate entities and public-sector and semi-autonomous organiza-
tions began with a request to explain how their organizations had become involved with SOI 
and what their respective involvements in the Games entailed. They were also asked to iden-
tify the opportunities they derived from their involvement with SOI, the issues that they 
faced, and how those issues were or had been dealt with. Volunteers were asked to describe 
their role and responsibilities and how they had decided to become involved with the Games 
and to explain the issues they confronted in their interactions with SOI, as well as how the 
issues had been handled.
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Archival data. We collected over 1,000 pages of archival records on the Special Olym-
pics, including planning documents, presentations, brochures, and press releases that SOI 
had issued, along with press articles (see Table 1). Of these documents, 1,069 pages provided 
insights that were particularly relevant to our research question and, thus, were used in our 
analysis. Some of these records were available publicly, while others came directly from 
our informants. Newspaper articles were collected from the LexisNexis database. An ini-
tial search for articles referring to the 2003 Games, SOI, and its management (e.g., “CEO” 
and “chairman”) produced 1,826 articles. After we excluded irrelevant and repeated articles, 
there were 280 articles left. This material provided background about public events and 
actions taken by the SOI, corporate entities, public and semi-autonomous entities, and vol-
unteers before and during the Games. It was also used to check and corroborate the available 
evidence on how the social venture managed its relationships with its resource providers as 
revealed by our analysis of the interviews.
Data Analysis
We examined all data in order to develop a fine-grained chronological description (Yin, 
2003) of the events taking place in the period from 1998, when the SOI won the bid to host 
the Special Olympics, to 2003, when the Games took place. Our use of multiple data sources 
to include interviews and archival records allowed us to acquire a rich understanding of the 
phenomenon under consideration (Jick, 1979). In preparing this description, we pursued both 
within-methods (i.e., across interviews) and between-methods (i.e., across different data 
sources) triangulation (Jick). The chronologically ordered data described the significant 
events associated with SOI’s attempts to organize the Games: how they came about, when 
they took place, the persons involved, and what the outcomes were.
Overall, our analysis follows established techniques for theory elaboration and involves a 
mixture of inductive and deductive reasoning (e.g., Lawrence et al., 2012). As we progressed 
in our analysis, recently published literature on resource mobilization by entrepreneurial and 
social ventures (e.g., Desa & Basu, 2013; Santos & Eisenhardt, 2009) focused our attention 
on how attracting potential partners and managing dependencies would be key objectives for 
the SOI. We were thus more keenly attuned to such issues in the coding of the chronologi-
cally ordered data, although they did not constrain our analysis. The next step directly 
addressed the research question. The analysis was iterative and recursive in nature and 
involved identifying patterns across coded data in order to assign them to specific categories 
(Miles & Huberman, 1994).
In order to address the first part of our research question, we examined all sources of data 
for comments on the types of support needed and the actions undertaken to achieve this sup-
port. Through this examination, we identified a number of tactics that the focal organization 
used to solicit participation. We coded these tactics and identified their target audiences and 
the response given in terms of acceptance, ambivalence, and rejection. For example, we 
found that the SOI representatives used appeals to commonly held values to identify actors 
potentially sympathetic to the cause and/or the event and then attempted to persuade ambiva-
lent actors by portraying the Games as an opportunity to meet their individual interests. To 
address the second part of the research question, we examined the data for statements that 
mentioned challenges faced by the various actors involved in organizing the Games. We 
coded these challenges, noting the actors involved, the actions undertaken to address them, 
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Table 1
Data Sources
Type of data Source Description/volume Uses
Interviews •• SOI managers •• Nine interviews in 2002; 
nine in 2003
•• Understand the SOI’s 
objectives for the Games
•• Understand how they identified 
resource providers
•• Understand how these 
relationships evolved over time
•• Corporate sponsors •• Five interviews in 2002; 
nine in 2003; interviews 
were conducted with all 
four levels of corporate 
sponsors
•• Explore why they had become 
involved with SOI and what 
resources and capabilities they 
provided
•• Comprehend the issues they 
faced in their interactions with 
SOI and whether and how they 
were resolved
•• Public-sector 
agencies
•• Two interviews in 2002; 
two in 2003
•• Understand why they had 
become involved with SOI and 
what resources and capabilities 
they provided
•• Comprehend the issues they 
faced in their interactions with 
SOI and whether and how they 
were resolved
•• Understand why they had 
become involved with SOI
•• Volunteers •• One interview in 2002; 
two in 2003
•• Comprehend the issues they 
faced in their interactions with 
SOI and whether and how they 
were resolved
Company 
documents
•• Planning 
documents
•• Policy manuals issued by 
SOI (136 pages)
•• Understand SOI’s portrayal 
of strategic and functional 
objectives and needs
•• Press releases •• Web site press releases 
(248 pages)
 
•• Presentations to 
resource providers
•• Presentations to corporate 
sponsors, volunteers, and 
staff (139 pages)
•• Understand SOI’s portrayal of 
its needs and objectives and 
how it responded to the issues 
faced in the interactions with 
its partners
Other 
documents
•• Press reports
•• Feedback surveys
•• 280 newspaper articles on 
the Games between 1998 
and 2003 (220 pages)
•• Newspaper of the Games 
(192 pages)
•• Memories of the Games 
(91 pages)
•• SOI awareness survey (25 
pages)
•• Volunteer experience 
survey (18 pages)
•• Understand the background to 
public events and actions taken 
by SOI, corporate sponsors, 
national governing bodies, and 
volunteers before and during 
the Games
Note: SOI = Special Olympics Ireland.
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and the outcomes of these actions. Our analysis revealed that SOI was intensely political and 
proactive in managing its relationships with resource providers. Their management efforts 
included making a series of requests for additional commitments of resources from sympa-
thetic parties and using subtle influence tactics with sympathetic-turned-ambivalent counter-
parties in order to restore their initial involvement.
We took several steps in our methods to enhance the quality of our findings. First, multiple 
coders independently coded the data and discussed the development of the codebook. 
Additionally, as the second and third authors were not involved in the collection of interview 
data, they were able to bring outsiders’ perspectives to the interpretation of the results and 
verify emerging insights. Second, gathering and analyzing data from a variety of sources 
ensured a more solid understanding of the phenomenon through data triangulation (Van de 
Ven, 2007). Third, a teaching case developed using part of the data (McNamara, Murray, 
Grampp, & Brown, 2003) was shared with a few key informants to verify the background on 
the Games and to confirm the sequence of key events, a practice akin to member checks 
(Nag, Corley, & Gioia, 2007). Finally, we also looked for disconfirming evidence to high-
light the limitations of our theoretical model.
Findings
Our research question was, How do social ventures mobilize external resources and how 
do they manage relationships with their resource providers? As we analyzed our interview 
and archival data, we found that the SOI used the 2003 Games as a catalyst to generate 
involvement in the cause of learning disabilities and to eventually create mutual dependence 
with various external parties. We found that the SOI employed six distinct tactics rooted in 
softer forms of power in its interactions with resource providers. This allowed the SOI to 
attract early pledges for support, consolidate and strengthen relationships with resource pro-
viders, and eventually exert control. The tactics employed by the SOI were contingent upon 
how the relationship with its partner evolved. That is to say, whether the relationship remained 
supportive or, with the passage of time, became ambivalent or even adversarial. We label the 
soft-power tactics that were employed by the SOI as appeal, persuasion, guidance, negotia-
tion, leverage, and cooptation. While three of these tactics—appeal, guidance, and lever-
age—were rooted in attraction, the other three, persuasion, negotiation, and cooptation, were 
anchored to inducement. We discuss each of these tactics in the next section. However, our 
proposed framework is dynamic, since we recognize that a supportive partner can become 
ambivalent or even adversarial (and vice versa) over the course of the relationship.
Facilitating Involvement With the Games and the Social Cause
The first aspect that we were interested in studying concerned how social ventures lever-
aged the visibility afforded by large-scale events to facilitate the involvement of external 
resource providers. We found that the SOI developed various appeals aimed at establishing 
emotional resonance between prospective resource providers and the event. Consistent with 
the extant literature (see Shrock, Holden, & Reid, 2004), we define emotional resonance as the 
connection between the emotional lives of a target audience and the manner in which the call 
for action is framed and pitched to its members. One way in which the SOI went about 
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establishing emotional resonance with the event was by drawing attention to the segregation 
that people with learning disabilities experience in their daily lives in order to demonstrate 
how this treatment contradicted core societal values, such as equality and respect for human 
dignity (see Table 2 for representative quotations). As a middle manager said, “People every-
where will understand that these people have feelings, emotions, abilities, and similarities just 
like the rest of us.” On a similar note, in an interview with the press, a senior manager said,
We want everyone to know that our athletes are citizens of their own countries, and full and 
equal citizens of the world. . . . If we can help to raise the consciousness of the world to that fact, 
we will have achieved all our goals. (Watterson, 1999: 23)
Another way in which SOI’s representatives built emotional resonance with the event 
involved positioning the success of the Games as a collective achievement, especially through 
the use of references to positive emotions, such as pride. By building emotional resonance, 
SOI was able to inspire a sense of personal responsibility for the fates of the Games in a large 
number of individuals, reaching more than just those with prior firsthand exposure to learn-
ing disabilities. Multiple informants observed that while the SOI consistently identified the 
athletes as its core stakeholder group, it also emphasized how the Games were an inclusive 
event whose implications reached beyond the domain of people with learning disabilities. 
This was done through the use of expressions such as “common goal,” “one team,” “share the 
feeling,” and “united effort”—all of which aimed to invoke a sense of shared ownership of 
the event:
The vision for the Games was a very simple vision. It was to host Games that the athletes would 
have been proud to participate in and that Ireland would be proud to host. That simply was the 
vision and what everybody knew as the vision for the Games. (Senior manager, SOI)
Initially, the SOI’s appeals resonated mainly with individuals who had direct exposure to 
learning disabilities and volunteering and with those who wanted the prejudices surrounding 
the cause to be lifted. They also attracted the attention of the Irish government, an agency that 
wished to improve its track record with the cause, and of the premier sponsor who genuinely 
wanted to make a difference:
I think 100% of people know that Special Olympics is a really, really good cause and think it 
is wonderful that the Games are coming to Ireland and then we get so much positive feedback 
[for] the fact that [we] made this happen right. So in terms of say our strategy for the 
sponsorship, rather than just sticking logos on to Special Olympics, our strategy is to make 
sure that [our] contribution results in a better experience for everybody that is involved with 
Special Olympics.
The SOI also took steps to persuade ambivalent individuals and organizations to lend their 
support to the event. An aspect of the persuasion efforts by SOI representatives that emerged 
from our analysis was their framing of prospective partners’ involvement in the successful 
organization of the Games as a means through which all parties involved would achieve 
valued outcomes. By justifying collaboration on the basis of a convergence of interests, the 
SOI was able to establish a wider base of support for the event than would have been possible 
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through moral or emotional appeals alone (see Table 2). A central aspect of SOI’s persuasion 
consisted in emphasizing the reputational benefits that commercial partners would derive 
Table 2
Evidence of Tactics Used to Facilitate the Involvement of Prospective Resource 
Providers
Categories Representative quotations Audience
Appeal “This was about giving back to another human being. It wasn’t for the bottom 
line. . . . You were actually going to see the results of this in the quality of life 
of another human being.” (Middle manager, SOI)
All
 “When North Carolina did the Games, it wasn’t Special Olympics North 
Carolina that bid for the Games, it was the Tourism Department that bid for 
the Games, because it was going to bring money, it was going to bring all 
sorts of benefits. For us, we did it because we wanted to raise more awareness, 
we wanted to create more opportunities for people with a learning disability.” 
(Senior manager, SOI)
All
 “The strap-band we used for the Games, ‘Share the feeling’, allowed everybody 
to share in a feeling of joy, excitement, pride.” (Senior manager, SOI)
All
 “The 2003 World Summer Games need your help to open a world of joy and 
opportunity for Special Olympics athletes all over the world. Today, time is 
the most precious commodity that any individual possesses.” (Belfast News 
Letter, 2001: 56)
All
 “We put a lot of emphasis on people-centered Games. . . . We started that off 
by saying who were the people, it was athletes first of all and the feeling that 
they created amongst certain people here in Ireland and their whole attitude, 
and their determination, courage and strength and endurance and skill, and all 
those things, inspired people.” (Senior manager, SOI)
All
 “All the competitors—as well as the eventual medalists—will triumph, but 
the real winners at this year’s Special Olympics will be sport itself, and the 
volunteers, supporters and members of the Irish public who get involved and 
‘share the feeling.’” (Battersby, 2003: 11)
All
Persuasion “[With corporate partners] we talk about things like mutual destiny, mutual 
success.” (Middle manager, SOI)
Sponsors
 “The organisers said that as this was the biggest event in Ireland in 2003, people 
would be foolish not to put their names down.” (Irish News, 2002: 6)
Volunteers
 “People are more aware that giving themselves brings an awful lot more to them 
than they would have thought before.” (Senior manager, SOI)
Volunteers
 “The key early on, however, was to secure a prime sponsor who would act as 
a catalyst to attract other corporations to sponsor the Games. This was easier 
said than done, according to [the CEO of the organizing committee] . . . so 
when we got [them] involved as the main sponsor, it gave a huge boost to the 
entire corporate sponsorship campaign.” (Irish Times, 2003: 61)
Sponsors
 “We would have organised the launch event [for the Volunteering Programme] 
in City Hall. . . . We would have had an invited audience of about 400 people 
including media. And we would have presented plans of the Volunteer 
Programme at that event in order to launch it.” (Middle manager, SOI)
Volunteers
 “We approached at official sponsorship level which was a million pounds at 
the time and that’s a level we pitched at now, if people said no, we would 
say, ‘We will come back at a later stage, official supplier level if you are 
interested’; some said yes some said no.” (Middle manager, SOI)
Sponsors
Note: SOI = Special Olympics Ireland.
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from their involvement with the Games, such as greater visibility for their products and ser-
vices, improved employee and customer relations, and being perceived as good corporate 
citizens. A middle manager explained how “having given a certain amount of value or 
resources to the Games [would have] helped us promote the Games but it also helped [com-
mercial partners] identify their product.” Similarly, in an article in the Irish Times, SOI 
highlighted,
“Last year when we were pitching to would-be sponsors we identified employee relations as a 
prime reason to get involved, especially for those companies with employee retention issues.”  
. . . Part of [the] presentation includes a video showing corporate employees volunteering at the 
Games. “When employers see just how much employees get from the experience, it is a major 
motivational factor.” (Harrision, 2001: 17)
Our analysis showed that these arguments resonated with the commercial entities that 
chose to get involved in the Games. Multiple informants made comments on the commercial 
benefits that they expected to derive in terms of portraying their organization as being atten-
tive to the wider community’s needs. These informants variously described how the decision 
to become involved in organizing the event allowed “a positive reinforcement of [our] 
brand,” “a lot of benefits to staff morale,” and made it possible “[for the entity] to be seen as 
a good corporate citizen.” An organization informant described the organization’s interac-
tions with SOI using the expression “you scratch my back and I’ll scratch yours.” An SOI 
middle manager observed that “they have given X to the Games and they’ve spent two times 
X telling the people that. But it was done in such a way that it helped the Games as well.” 
Noncommercial factors also played a role in persuading some partners to get involved. These 
included an organization’s history of support for the cause as well as an alignment between 
the nature of the event and an organization’s own concern for the well-being of the 
community:
The key thing for us as an organization going forward is that we are perceived to be a good 
community spirited organization, trustworthy and reliable . . . we thought that the Special 
Olympics was a nice way of reflecting those values and also saying something about what [our 
company] stands for. (Corporate partner)
[Our company] has a long-established tradition of working with people with disabilities. This is 
why our support of the World Games is an ideal partnership for us. (Corporate partner)
In the case of volunteers, the SOI’s main challenge was to convince those without per-
sonal histories of volunteering or firsthand exposure to these disabilities to participate. Mass 
participation was considered critical to ensuring the success of the event. The SOI made 
frequent references to the uniqueness of the event, the positive nature of the experience, and 
the sense of achievement that would result from volunteering one’s time to the cause. One 
informant recalled how volunteers were told that “through their experience, they will leave 
the Games a little taller, a little more aware of how really special it can be when barriers are 
overcome.”
Earlier studies on resource mobilization efforts by entrepreneurial ventures have focused 
on the use of discursive tactics (e.g., Martens et al., 2007; Zott & Huy, 2007) and signaling 
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tactics (Andreoni, 2006) directed at prospective resource providers. These tactics direct their 
appeal mainly to the logical part of the minds of their targets (Green, 2004) and do so by 
helping to elucidate the focal organization’s identity and ability to deliver upon its underlying 
purpose. Our findings reveal an additional, but nevertheless important, element of resource 
mobilization that has been overlooked in prior studies, namely, the use of appeals directed to 
the moral and emotional sensibilities of the target audience. Social ventures that advocate 
low-profile or stigmatized causes stand to benefit especially where public involvement is 
concerned when they invoke positive emotions and depict the collaborative effort as an 
opportunity to make a meaningful difference. Our evidence that the use of references to com-
monly held values and emotions facilitates the attraction of external parties towards stigma-
tized groups and ultimately confers power to the focal organization complements prior 
findings on the role of prestige in inducing attraction and conferring power through affilia-
tion (e.g., Zott & Huy).
In summary, our findings demonstrate that social ventures advocating low-profile, stigma-
tized causes leverage the visibility afforded by large-scale events to attract prospective 
resource providers by creating alignment between the event and their values and interests. 
Attraction is traditionally a key element of softer forms of power (e.g., Nye, 1990, 2004). 
Social ventures often require a wide range of resources to pursue their mandates and tend to 
rely on a larger number of partners with more heterogeneous views towards the cause than 
do other ventures, which are often dependent upon fewer partners. Social ventures must 
modify their discourse according to their target audience. These arguments lead to the fol-
lowing propositions:
Proposition 1a: Social ventures that seek to promote changes in attitudes will tend to do so through 
the organization of large-scale events that provide visibility to the social problem and allow the 
creation of a sense of shared ownership.
Proposition 1b: Social ventures will facilitate the involvement of external parties by developing a 
wide array of arguments that highlight how the event is aligned with their values and interests.
Proposition 1c: Social ventures will facilitate the involvement of external parties by developing 
arguments that seek to establish an emotional connection between them and the event.
Proposition 1d: Social ventures will facilitate the involvement of external parties that do not respond 
to their emotional appeals by developing arguments that emphasize how their involvement with 
the event will meet their interests.
Although some prospective partners were persuaded to get involved in organizing the 
Games with SOI, others were not. Organizations that chose not to get involved with the 
Games included mainly U.S. and European multinational companies (MNCs) based in 
Ireland, who had been initially targeted as possible providers of tangible and intangible 
resources in the form of knowledge and expertise. For example, initial documents during the 
bidding process specified that
[commercial partners would be] drawn from the top Irish companies, and the multinational 
companies who are based in Ireland. Particular emphasis will be placed on the Irish/American 
companies based in Ireland. It is planned that the expertise of influential Irish/American 
business people will be used in our approach to the major companies. (Office of the Tanaiste, 
1996: 17)
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SOI’s attempts to attract or persuade Irish American MNCs to act as major partners in the 
Games were a failure despite the strong business and cultural links between the United States 
and Ireland. The European MNCs also proved difficult to access. Most of the companies that 
pledged their support to the Games were Irish companies, Irish subsidiaries of foreign com-
panies, or public-sector organizations. Informants explained that the main reason for this 
failure to attract foreign participants was the event’s lack of resonance with corporate entities 
outside the domestic context. For example, a large European company chose not to get 
involved because of the limited benefits from outside of Ireland that it expected to derive 
from the event:
It wasn’t because it wasn’t the right thing to do. It would have been impossible to allocate the 
cost of it across Europe because it was a local event happening in Ireland. The other markets 
wouldn’t have bought into it. (Corporate partner)
A representative of a company with international operations that the SOI had approached 
for a potential partnership noted that its non-Irish operators were not very interested or sup-
portive of the company’s involvement with the Games. The informant explained,
A lot of the shops are in the UK and the public image of the Special Olympics is non-existent 
there. So therefore it was way harder for our franchisees in England to be excited about it.
This evidence contrasts with the same company’s Irish-based operations:
This year we reckon we would have put the Special Olympics logo on forty million items that 
we had printed, whether it was bags, or cups or jars of coffee or whatever. Everybody who’s 
interacting with us now would be aware of it. . . . Companies have wanted to do business or 
franchisees have wanted to join us because they perceive this is the kind of company they want 
to be involved with. (Corporate partner)
Thus, our analysis also shows that there are limits to the potential of tactics rooted in soft 
power to leverage the visibility afforded by large-scale events and to develop a network of 
resource providers. We find that potential partners are less likely to become involved if 
resource mobilization efforts by social ventures fail to tap into their commercial and emo-
tional interests. This is more likely to occur when social ventures seek to involve organiza-
tions located outside of the referent community. Accordingly, we argue that the benefits to 
organizations from their involvement with social initiatives are mainly embedded in a local 
context (see Marquis et al., 2007). Promised or anticipated positive reputation spillovers are 
likely to be greater in the case of community-embedded partners because geographic proxim-
ity to events facilitates stakeholders’ awareness and appreciation of their involvement. 
Additionally, community-embedded events tap into and amplify the salience of the local 
identity (Tilcsik & Marquis, 2013), something which would resonate more strongly with 
partners located within the referent community than with partners located outside of it. This 
argument leads to our second proposition:
Proposition 2: Social ventures will be more successful in facilitating the involvement of external 
parties who are embedded in the local community than of those who are not.
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Consolidating the Relationship With Resource Providers
The second aspect that our study focused on pertained to how social ventures managed 
their relationships with resource providers. Our analysis reveals that SOI engaged in two 
tactics to consolidate the relationships with its resource providers beyond the initial indica-
tions of support: guiding those who continued to be supportive in such a way as to set the 
basis for collaboration and then also negotiating with those who had threatened to withdraw 
from the event to ensure that they would return to being supportive or at least would remain 
involved in spite of reduced contributions. Table 3 provides illustrative examples of these 
tactics.
The first tactic involved drawing supporters’ attention to the presence of multiple oppor-
tunities to contribute and allowing some decentralization of responsibility over how these 
contributions would be delivered, primarily as a way to sustain commitments from support-
ive external parties. The SOI representatives promised that every contribution, independent 
of its nature and its magnitude, would be recognized and make a difference. This approach 
allowed the SOI to access the resources it needed while simultaneously strengthening its 
initial arguments on the inclusive nature of the event. The SOI consolidated its relationship 
with supportive commercial entities by developing a tier-based structure wherein different 
tiers reflected the different commitment of resources that each partner was willing to make. 
A greater commitment of resources gave each partner the opportunity to showcase its support 
of the Games at prominent events. Such a structure allowed the SOI to appeal both to larger 
organizations, which could afford to take on more prominent roles, and to smaller ones, 
which could still be involved on a smaller scale by providing resources that were inexpensive 
or relatively easy to source. The SOI’s flexible and imaginative approach, which enabled 
partner organizations to contribute in multiple ways, also appealed to individual members of 
the community who often wished to get involved as volunteers but were concerned about 
lacking specific skills. Many informants shared how the SOI personnel had frequently 
emphasized that all contributions and skills were important and welcome. A middle manager 
explained,
There are obviously specialised areas . . . they are specialised skills that the ordinary person 
might or might not have . . . I have heard of people who have looked at the application form and 
said “I don’t have any of those skills.” That doesn’t mean we don’t want them. We want everyone 
who is willing to give their time and their energy to this. We are not going to turn away anyone.
Several individuals responded to SOI’s entreaties for specific skills as well. For example, 
an informant recalled, “I had a skill that I knew that they needed. I felt like I could contribute 
something very specific . . . I had skills that could really be put to very good use” (Volunteer). 
On a similar note, the Irish Times captured this point in its reporting of a volunteer’s views 
on the subject:
“I wasn’t long back in Ireland after living away for years, when I saw the ad looking for people. 
Before that, I knew nothing about the Special Olympics,” he says. “I used to do some riding for 
the disabled in England, and I thought I could offer the skills I had. It’s the first time the Games 
will be in Ireland, and I wanted to be part of it. I tell everyone I come in contact with that I’ve 
volunteered, and I try to get them interested, too.” (Boland, 2002: 11)
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Table 3
Evidence of Tactics Used to Consolidate the Relationship With Resource Providers
Categories Representative quotations Audience
Guidance “‘A mature lady asked me last week if she was too old to volunteer: the message 
needs to go out that everyone has something to offer, and that we are not only 
looking for people with sports-related skills,’ Maguire says. ‘Somebody making 
the tea is doing a very important job, and older people have time to offer that 
working people don’t have.’” (Boland, 2002: 11)
Volunteers
 “Some [ties with sponsors] are straightforward commercial in that they see us the 
same as any other client, some are part commercial in that they need to have us 
as a commercial client because they can’t give it to us for nothing but they are 
giving us a significant discount and then there is a very small group that is giving 
us the facilities for nothing—so it is a mixture.” (Middle manager, SOI).
Sponsors
 “[The Games] got the benefit of the expertise and skills that various people had . . . 
depending on their roles.” (Sponsor)
Sponsors
 “There was enough ingenuity at a level to say ‘We can solve this, here’s the 
parameters, we’re not doing anything wrong,’ and you had to have the 
confidence to let them go and solve it. And we couldn’t and we shouldn’t get 
involved.” (Senior manager, SOI)
Volunteers
 “If someone wants to be a volunteer they fill in an application form . . . on the 
application form people give their names and addresses and phone numbers etc. 
They can indicate what skills they have. . . . What we are in the process of doing 
now is interviewing all those people . . . and then after that training. . . . There 
are three different types of training, there is generic training, about dealing with 
people from foreign delegations and most importantly dealing with people with 
a learning disability . . . and also a little bit about world Games and what Special 
Olympics is actually about. . . . And then there is venue-specific training where 
they have a walk-through of what venue they will be at.” (Middle manager, SOI)
Volunteers
Negotiation “[Volunteers] can express a preference of what functional area or volunteer 
opportunity they want to be involved in. . . . The preference is based on what 
area is preferable for them to work in and on their skills.” (Middle manager, 
SOI)
Volunteers
 “It had been agreed [that] we would protect [one of the sponsors] from [a larger 
sponsor, who was a competitor] because if they put a huge amount of money into 
an advertising campaign it could dwarf [the smaller one]. So we had to put that 
as part of the [large sponsor’s] contract that they had limited promotion which 
suited them.” (Senior manager, SOI)
Sponsors
 “We are going to organisations and businesses and companies and asking them on 
a three-tier system. The first tier would be just to give us the platform to give the 
information to their employees. The second tier would be that they might give 
two or three days off, as in not being taken from their holidays, and third would 
be to give five days, five working days to the volunteers and give them back 
those days from their holidays.” (Middle manager, SOI)
Volunteers
 “The public were hit with different advertising campaigns. They were different in 
the sense that different sponsors were coming in at different times because we 
didn’t want them competing with each other.” (Middle manager, SOI)
Sponsors
 “The six official sponsors got ownership of a specific Games programme . . . they 
would have got dominant signage at the sports venues . . . the official suppliers 
got sponsorship of some of the sports venues but they didn’t get the ownership 
of the programme.” (Middle manager, SOI)
Sponsors
 “Everybody was given access [but] the premier and official sponsors were given 
free space, the official suppliers and friends had to pay for space.” (Middle 
manager, SOI)
Sponsors
Note: SOI = Special Olympics Ireland.
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The SOI also guided supportive partners by allowing autonomy regarding the delivery of 
their contributions while at the same time establishing binding requirements and boundaries 
to be respected. This way of structuring relationships with its resource providers allowed the 
focal organization to capitalize upon partners’ commitment and specific capabilities, made 
them accountable in the eyes of the public for the success of the initiatives for which they 
were responsible, and enabled the SOI to oversee their conduct in relation to the Games and 
ensure that the intended event objectives were attained. For example, although the SOI 
allowed corporate entities a significant degree of autonomy over how their involvement with 
the event was going to be communicated to the public, the social venture set stringent criteria 
for the use of the logo of the Games and had the final say on the content of all external com-
munication. A middle manager recalled how “we were given the scripts of loads of commer-
cials to see if they [had] the correct terminology and references to the Games. [If a mistake 
was found], we would have explained the situation . . . and ask[ed] people to withdraw it.” 
Similarly, volunteers were given discretion over how specific activities were going to be run 
but were also provided with blueprints to be followed and milestones to be met. The SOI 
positioned the relationship with its partners as mutually beneficial and emphasized that they 
should work together rather than disagree with each other in order to appropriate the most 
value from each transaction. For example, one representative of a corporate entity admitted 
that the SOI “made it crystal clear as to what each sponsor had to do to fit with the pro-
gramme.” Another remarked that “it was so much a partnership approach: they knew what 
we were doing and why we were doing it. We knew what they were doing, what they needed 
to do.” However, while decentralization of responsibility to external partners was generally 
associated with positive outcomes, it occasionally exposed the social venture to vulnerability. 
This occurred in the case of two partners who, after pledging their support to the event, real-
ized that they were unable to provide the full amount of funds and resources promised to the 
SOI because of capacity constraints and were forced to seek the assistance of external parties 
that were not directly involved with the Games in order to meet their obligations.
Taken together, these findings suggest that social ventures mobilize external parties after 
receiving initial indications of support by guiding those who remain invested and by negoti-
ating with those who become critical of an event’s organization. While earlier studies have 
recognized the need for social ventures to facilitate participation of external parties as a 
means to access resources, particularly specialized ones (Di Domenico et al., 2010; Peredo 
& Chrisman, 2006), they have paid little attention to the mechanisms that are used to promote 
participation. Social ventures have been shown to foster the participation of key external par-
ties with valuable contacts or with persons who can facilitate access to much-needed resources 
because of their roles in governance structures (e.g., chairmen). However, the success of a 
social venture’s advocacy generally relies on mass participation from the referent community 
(Austin et al., 2006; Mair & Marti, 2009; Peredo & Chrisman). Our evidence extends an 
understanding of these functions by showing how social ventures foster mass participation 
by embedding themselves in the local community. We show how social ventures channel 
initial support by drawing attention to the presence of multiple opportunities to contribute 
and make a positive difference and by creating a sense of ownership of the event within the 
wider community through decentralization of responsibility over key activities, thereby har-
nessing greater participation than would have been possible through involving only a few 
major partners.
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A precondition for the use of guidance tactics such as the ones described above is the pres-
ence of trust between the focal organization and its external resource providers (see also Grey 
& Garsten, 2001). Thus, a social venture’s decision to decentralize responsibility for certain 
activities is likely to rest upon an expectation that the decision would be reciprocated through 
trustworthy and appropriate actions in light of its counterparties’ support of the underlying 
social cause and of their joint dependence (also see Villanueva et al., 2012), facilitated by 
their initial pledges of support to the event. Steps taken by social ventures to decentralize 
authority and offer greater participatory rights to their partners are also expected to enhance 
partners’ sense of ownership of the event and willingness to contribute to its success (Wagner, 
1995) and are consequently expected to reinforce their support of the initiative. Creating 
multiple opportunities to contribute and allowing for a certain level of flexibility is also par-
ticularly warranted with supportive resource providers who stand to gain little in return (e.g., 
volunteers), in order to channel and sustain support (Farmer & Fedor, 2001). Thus, we pro-
pose the following:
Proposition 3a: Social ventures will channel the involvement of supportive external parties by 
drawing attention to the multiple opportunities for contribution to foster mass participation.
Proposition 3b: Social ventures will enable the engagement of supportive external parties by decen-
tralizing the responsibility for delivering their chosen contributions so as to allow them to build 
upon their skills and capabilities.
Our analysis also reveals that the SOI engaged in negotiations with those individuals and 
organizations that threatened to withdraw their support because of disagreements in order to 
persuade them to renew their support of the Games. One area where disagreements often 
occurred pertained to the definition of the contributions expected from the corporate part-
ners. As more partners came on board and pledged their resources, several of the initially 
supportive partners began to express concerns that the benefits they had expected to derive 
from their involvement with the Games would not be fully realized. A representative from 
one of the corporate entities explained, “You felt that you were more important in the begin-
ning but as more people came on you began to feel less important.” Another expressed con-
cern that the public would not be aware “that [their] relationship with Special Olympics 
Ireland was unique.” Our analysis suggests that the SOI overcame resistance by ensuring that 
the visibility afforded to external partners reflected the extent of support received. The ven-
ture granted each partner exclusive rights over events that were in line with their specific area 
of business expertise whenever possible and imposed strict contractual conditions on part-
ners who were also competitors. For example, one informant explained how the social ven-
ture dealt with two competitors who had been enlisted as supporters and were expected to 
provide a contribution of equal worth. The SOI feared that the larger company could out-
spend the smaller one in advertising its contribution. Thus, while each partner received rights 
to organize and showcase its respective involvement at distinct events, the larger company’s 
contract included a clause that capped its amount of advertising to ensure fairness.
One partner with whom the SOI engaged in protracted negotiations over the details of its 
contribution was a broadcasting agency. This entity had rebuffed SOI’s guidance, citing the 
argument that their operations required greater autonomy than the social venture had been 
willing to allow them and/or how their specialized knowledge and skills put them at an 
advantage over the social venture. For example, in April 2003, the broadcaster needed to run 
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through the venues where the various activities were going to be held in order to determine 
the positioning of its equipment. When the social venture sought to overrule this on safety 
grounds, the broadcaster resisted and, instead, required others to organize around its 
requirements:
Once the camera positions [were identified] there would have been fighting over that and the 
cable issues and health and safety issues and there would have been a lot of “if we can’t get a 
camera there, we can’t come here.” (Corporate partner)
Eventually, the SOI acquiesced because it was not able to exert its influence over issues that 
the broadcaster viewed as falling within its area of competence.
Additionally, considerable disagreements between the social venture and the broadcaster 
ensued regarding how the latter’s support of the event would be showcased. For example, the 
broadcaster contested the creation of a CD with the soundtrack of the Games that included 
music by its orchestra on grounds that its involvement had not been properly acknowledged. 
Publication of the first print run had already occurred, but the broadcasting agency insisted 
that the social venture rectify this in all future print runs. A similar disagreement arose over 
the catalogue for the opening ceremony of the Games:
We had an issue with the catalogue for the opening ceremony; we were broadcasting it for four 
and a half hours and the catalogue nearly went to print without us being mentioned in it. It had 
two ads, which everyone got which was part of the contract, but we were the broadcaster, which 
is major and which is different to just your recognition in two ads. . . . [Communicating that the 
catalogue issue must be addressed] would have been very much with [the CEO of the organizing 
committee] that night, it got quite heavy. . . . Not being taken for granted, I suppose, that’s what 
I found the hardest thing. (Corporate partner)
Our findings reveal that social ventures engage in negotiation tactics with external parties 
to propose solutions to emerging disagreements. These tactics are collaborative in nature as 
they seek to maximize joint outcomes through bargaining and making concessions. Thus we 
argue that in order to consolidate the relationships with their external partners, social ven-
tures not only need to establish a connection between the cause and each group of partners’ 
valued outcomes but also need to address how the collaboration would allow each party to 
achieve the desired outcomes. One important aspect of social ventures’ efforts to consolidate 
relationships with external resource providers that emerged from our analysis involved bal-
ancing the need to make concessions to individual commercial partners, namely, to reinforce 
the initial positioning of collaboration with the cause as a win-win for both parties with the 
need to enable the distinctiveness of the contributions made by all the various partners in the 
eyes of the public.
Since social ventures tend to establish a large number of relationships with various agen-
cies (Austin et al., 2006), they are more likely to confront a need to protect the interests of 
each member of their partner network from erosion than are commercial ventures, who tend 
to establish collaborative relationships with one or several more established resource provid-
ers and who, as such, can focus on protecting their own interests in these relationships (Katila 
et al., 2008). Our findings augment the evidence presented by some prior studies on social 
ventures (Di Domenico et al., 2010), which document their use persuasion tactics to 
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pressurize and enlist initial support from key decision makers. These tactics are likely to be 
particularly fruitful when the success of the social cause depends upon the actions of one or 
few key stakeholders (i.e., policy makers) or when the social entity’s objective is to garner 
grassroots support for the cause through initiatives that seek to influence key opinion leaders 
as a way to facilitate further participation. In this instance, we show that when the success of 
a social cause depends upon the involvement of several individual partners, consolidating the 
relationships with them involves engaging in discussions in order to reach an agreement over 
the aims and scopes of the collaboration. We also draw attention to how social ventures make 
concessions to those partners who possess specialized resources or skills that cannot be sub-
stituted or bypassed when it is not possible to reach an agreement through discussions and 
bargaining. Thus, we posit the following:
Proposition 4: Social ventures are more likely to make concessions to external parties who possess 
nonsubstitutable resources and skills than to those who do not possess them.
Exerting Control in the Relationship With Resource Providers
Our analysis also showed how, when resource providers had channeled their initial attrac-
tion to the cause into tangible contributions, the social venture grew more assertive in its 
relationships with them even as it continued to employ soft-power tactics. The social venture 
engaged in two tactics to exert control: leveraging the commitment of those partners who 
continued to be supportive so that they would scale up their contributions and coopting legiti-
mate third parties to exert pressure on those partners who threatened to withdraw from the 
event so that they would return to being supportive or, at least, would not be disruptive to the 
event’s organization. Table 4 presents examples of these two tactics.
The first type of tactic employed by the social venture involved making requests for addi-
tional contributions to many of its partners over and above what had been initially negotiated 
and proved to be a point of contention with a few of them. These requests were mainly 
directed by the focal organization to those partners who had been and continued to be most 
supportive of the event. This group comprised some of the corporate entities, volunteers, and 
staff. One area where the shortage of resources was particularly pressing was human 
resources. The social venture made requests for additional commitment of time to existing 
staff and volunteers. One senior SOI manager observed, “People were working at any time, 
night or day . . . volunteers seemed to work beyond their hours, they’d do two or three shifts.” 
Another informant similarly remarked, “I never worked so hard in my life. I didn’t have a day 
off for about three weeks.” The social venture also sought to attract additional volunteers by 
convincing their corporate partners to agree to the secondment of their staff to the event, as 
this method allowed the SOI to access needed human resources without incurring extra costs. 
One informant explained,
Each [functional area] director was asked to identify their needs in terms of head counts in the 
various areas and why did they think they needed those additional resources. A part of that 
exercise was also to identify did they know individuals who also may have the skills set that they 
needed that we could approach. . . . We always tried to source either unpaid or secondment staff, 
and if we then couldn’t source the staff through those two routes, we then went the direct paid 
route. (Middle manager, SOI)
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In addition to approaching existing corporate partners with requests for additional contri-
butions in the form of secondment of staff, the social venture sought to obtain tangible 
resources so as to reduce the pressures of resource acquisition on its budget. Several staff 
members of the SOI mentioned being asked to push external parties to escalate their commit-
ment to the Games. One informant explained, “We became fundraisers and [were] always 
looking for things for free.” Similarly, multiple corporate partners’ representatives com-
mented on how they felt subject to pressures to provide additional resources. A representative 
of an involved corporate entity stated, “We got the feeling from the Special Olympics that 
they were looking for handouts for this and that.” Another, likewise, explained,
Our financial contribution was somewhere in the region of 7 to 8 million [up from 4 million] by 
the time we were finished and [in addition to providing funding], we also offered 27 people a 
six-month secondment to the Games, so we paid their salaries for six months and they worked 
with Special Olympics. (Corporate partner)
Several partners caved in to the social venture’s requests because of a belief that the visi-
bility that would be derived from participation in the Games would still allow them to achieve 
Table 4
Evidence of Tactics Used to Exert Control in the Relationship With Resource 
Providers
Categories Representative quotations Audience
Leverage “[Most corporate and government agencies’ partners gave] over and above 
what they intended to give. And I think the more [the sponsors] felt it being 
successful . . . the more resources they put into it.” (Senior manager, SOI)
Sponsors
 “The people in head office are in from eight in the morning until ten o’clock at 
night, every single night of the week and at weekends as well.” (Volunteer)
Volunteer
 “They [SOI’s top management] relied too much on staff and on staff working 
those kinds of hours. And on the volunteer commitment as well.” (Middle 
manager, SOI)
Staff
 “[Sponsors gave] over and above what they intended to give.” (Senior manager, 
SOI)
Sponsors
 “The sponsors . . . felt that they had given a huge contribution and found it 
interesting to find out they were being asked for extra.” (Middle manager, 
SOI)
Sponsors
Cooptation “There was a wave of public opinion against the government in discriminating 
against people with special needs.” (Senior manager, SOI)
Government
 “[The support by international agencies] was an extra sort of leverage for us.” 
(Senior manager, SOI)
Government
 “[One of our divisions] wouldn’t be able to supply all the vehicles from their 
own fleet because they had to continue their day-to-day working, so they had 
their own fleet but they hired in private operators.” (Sponsor)
Sponsor
 “[SOI] felt they couldn’t have one supplier responsible for everything. I think 
they may have thought as well in the past that [we] were known for industrial 
action. [The other supplier] alone wouldn’t have been able to do it, but the 
fact that [it] was there was a spur to us to try harder.” (Sponsor)
Sponsor
 “All host towns would have a local bus operator in the area who would be doing 
private hire, taking people to sports and dances.” (Sponsor)
Sponsor
Note: SOI = Special Olympics Ireland.
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their initial objectives. A few others attempted to resist, either because they were unwilling 
to provide further resources or because they were unable to do so as a result of profitability 
concerns, but then yielded because of reputational considerations. For example, one partner 
was asked to pay for the printing of some promotional material over and above the contribu-
tion it had already made. When the partner refused because it did not consider this to be a 
reasonable request, the social venture resorted to exerting stronger pressures. One informant 
from the SOI who was working closely with this partner explained how it was made clear 
that “if they ever say no, it would affect their relationships with us.” While the partner was 
dissatisfied with the way in which the issue was handled, it did eventually yield to SOI’s 
requests. We found evidence of only two partners who were successful in rebuffing the 
requests made by the SOI as they had committed to providing only intangible resources and 
also had refused to formalize their relationship, which would have made their position less 
defensible. As such, they had the upper hand in their relationships with the SOI. One repre-
sentative for one of the two corporate entities admitted, “I suppose it was more important to 
them [SOI] to work well with us [than otherwise] in the end.”
Our analysis suggests that the demands for additional contributions described above 
allowed the social venture to address its resource gaps but would not have been sustainable 
in the long term. A few staff members and volunteers complained that too much had been 
expected of them and expressed reservations at the prospect of being involved in similar 
efforts in the future. An informant stated, “[A fellow staff member] would say that he 
wouldn’t work for Special Olympics again.” Another explained, “I wouldn’t have the energy 
to do it again.” Some corporate partners also expressed reservations at the prospect of getting 
involved in similar initiatives in the future out of concerns that the benefits derived did not 
reflect the size of their contribution in light of the large number of partners enlisted to partici-
pate in the event.
The SOI also used the tactic of coopting the support of powerful and legitimate third par-
ties to exert pressures over those who threatened to withdraw their support. One such instance 
involved the emergence of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in early 2003 in some 
of the countries whose athletes were expected to participate in the Games. The Irish govern-
ment, one of the event’s earlier supporters, took on a conflicting position by passing a provi-
sion that denied athletes from SARS-affected countries permission to enter the country. The 
SOI sought the support of the community and other legitimate external parties in hopes that 
they could influence the government to reverse its decision. Its representatives reached out to 
the community through various media to provoke a wave of public outcry against the ban. 
For example, they drew attention to the unfairness of the decision, as business travelers and 
tourists from the affected countries were allowed to enter Ireland while athletes participating 
in the Games were not. One senior manager said, “It’s unfair on the Special Olympics to say 
that you’ll ban the participants in certain countries from travelling, yet then go on to let in 
tourists or businessmen from these areas.” These comments were echoed by the president of 
Special Olympics International:
This ban—incredibly to us—appears to be directed not at the general populations coming from 
SARS-affected areas, but only toward our Special Olympics delegations coming from those 
areas. What a tragic irony it would be if Special Olympics athletes—all people with learning 
disabilities—would suffer such an indignity as this. (Timothy Shriver, as quoted in Joanilho, 
2003: 1)
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Other agencies such as the World Health Organization (WHO) and several charitable 
organizations also criticized the government’s decision on ethical grounds:
Last night the WHO’s SARS spokesman, Mr. Dick Thompson, said the decision [to ban athletes 
from SARS-affected areas] went against the body’s latest guidelines. “We understand that 
governments have to make their own assessments based on individual risks and resources. The 
decision [taken] today is not consistent with these guidelines.” (Hennessey, 2003: 1)
There are many people in the disability sector today who are shocked and deeply disappointed at 
the decision to withdraw invites from these very special athletes. (Angela Kerins, National 
Disability Association, as quoted in Robinson, 2003: 10)
By rallying the support of external parties who questioned the decision both on medical 
and ethical grounds, the SOI not only obtained the endorsement of powerful and legitimate 
actors who could successfully exercise pressures on the government but also provoked a 
grassroots response from within the community, whose members took several initiatives in 
favor of the ban being overthrown, including writing letters to national newspapers and 
engaging in protests. Remarkably, the social venture was able to mobilize widespread sup-
port from a community that had a poor track record with the cause of intellectual 
disabilities.
On the whole, these findings indicate that while social ventures might initially be the more 
vulnerable party in the relationships with their resource providers, the progressive reciprocal 
embedding of partners that occurs through repeated interactions shifts the power relations in 
favor of the focal organization (also see Gulati & Sytch, 2007). The social venture’s attempts 
to escalate the contributions expected from its partners do not contradict the tenets of this 
reciprocal dependence, since relationships, in order to be sustainable and create shared value, 
should be equitable (i.e., each partner should perceive that the relationship allows them to 
achieve valued outcomes) but not necessarily egalitarian (i.e., the benefits received by each 
partner do not need to be equal to those received by others; Villanueva et al., 2012).
A social venture’s exercise of soft control can occur through direct or indirect tactics 
depending upon the level of a partner’s support of the collaborative effort and on the level of 
clout needed to convince a partner to comply with the venture’s requests. We found that the 
SOI used a direct tactic with those partners who continued to be engaged in the cause and 
viewed the event as creating value for them. This tactic was akin to bricolage (Baker & 
Nelson, 2005; Di Domenico et al., 2009) as the social venture tapped its existing ties to 
obtain additional resources, often in a creative and cost-effective manner, such as by seeking 
the secondment of staff from its corporate partners. Prior studies have argued that bricolage 
is a means by which newly established social ventures make do with any resource they can 
access out of necessity and vulnerability (i.e., satisfice). Furthermore, it is said to be an 
approach that is abandoned once the organization has acquired prominence in the relation-
ship with its resource providers (Desa & Basu, 2013). Our findings, however, show that 
social ventures can continue using bricolage as a means to acquire resources that they actu-
ally need (i.e., organizations can maximize) even after having established an ongoing rela-
tionship with their resource providers. This is due to the reciprocal embeddedness of the 
partners that facilitates a shift in power relations. In this study, the indirect tactic of coopta-
tion (Selznick, 1949) was found to be used instead with those parties who threatened to 
withdraw their support to the cause.
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Cooptation of legitimate third parties to support one’s agenda is a particularly useful tactic 
when one is dealing with more powerful actors because it helps level the playing field, par-
ticularly in situations when direct interactions have failed (Cialdini, 2001). This tactic shares 
some similarities with activities such as lobbying and collective action, as described by Di 
Domenico and colleagues (2010), in that in both cases, social ventures seek to influence a 
powerful stakeholder to comply with their requests through a third party, most commonly the 
members of the local community. The success of these activities is generally attributed to the 
networking efforts of the social ventures and their rapport with key members of the commu-
nity. Our study instead draws attention to the use of communication that invokes commonly 
held values, such as equality and fairness, as a means to portray the resisting parties’ argu-
ments and exert grassroots pressures on dissenting parties. Although references to rhetorical 
tactics that appeal to a target audience’s moral and ethical dispositions (ethos) through refer-
ences to the right and appropriate thing to do can be found in the literature on the diffusion 
of new practices (Green, 2004; Suchman, 1995), they have received little attention in the 
literature on social ventures. We provide evidence on how ethos-based appeals are a power-
ful tool that could assist social ventures in not only facilitating external parties’ initial 
involvement with their cause but also overcoming the resistance of powerful partners. Thus 
we posit the following:
Proposition 5a: Social ventures will tend to become increasingly demanding of contributions and 
more assertive with supportive resource providers as these relationships mature.
Proposition 5b: Social ventures will tend to deal with conflict with dissenting resource providers by 
coopting the support of legitimate external parties who advocate on their behalf.
Discussion and Conclusion
This study analyzed how a social venture leveraged its organization of a large event to 
mobilize much-needed resources for a social cause that historically had a low profile. The 
focus was on the actions taken by the social venture to manage its relationships with multiple 
partners over time as its resource mobilization gathered momentum. We have shown how, 
despite being highly dependent on external resources, the social venture was able to create 
conditions of mutual dependence and exercise agency in its relationships with resource pro-
viders through the use of tactics rooted in soft forms of power. The exercise of power was 
dynamic as these tactics varied in intensity depending upon the maturity of the relationship 
with each partner and their current level of support of the effort. Specifically, the social ven-
ture sought to engage potential partners by attracting them through values-based and inter-
ests-based discursive tactics. They also sought to consolidate and formalize this initial 
engagement by offering guidance and facilitating decentralization. When tensions and con-
flicts arose with some partners, the social venture embarked in negotiations and made con-
cessions to those partners who possessed critical and nonsubstitutable skills. When making 
concessions was not feasible (e.g., during the SARS crisis), it sought the support of other 
legitimate entities to exert pressure on the resisting partners. It must, however, be clarified 
that the use of soft power was not Machiavellian in nature. Rather, it enabled social outcomes 
in a collaborative manner. Figure 1 captures one explanation of how social ventures can 
mobilize resources through engendering mutual dependence.
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Theoretical Implications
The findings of our study have several theoretical implications. First, following some 
recent reviews of the social entrepreneurship literature that have urged a stronger grounding 
in mainstream organization theories (Nicholls, 2010; Short, Moss, & Lumpkin, 2009), we 
highlight how resource dependence theory offers a particularly appropriate theoretical 
anchor, given its recent focus on how resource-needy actors can manage their resource dis-
advantages. Thus, we urge future research in the domain of social entrepreneurship to deliver 
upon the promise of this recent interest in the area of “mutual dependence” (e.g., Casciaro & 
Piskorski, 2005; Gulati & Sytch, 2007; Villanueva et al., 2012) and augment current under-
standings of how social ventures can manage their resource needs and create shared value. 
While we explored how social ventures might achieve this through the organization of a 
large-scale event, additional opportunities exist to build theory in this area, including explor-
ing the role of alternative mechanisms (e.g., long-term partnerships), comparing the various 
outcomes obtainable from establishing relationships with different degrees of mutual depen-
dence, and investigating the boundary conditions and limitations of mutual dependence.
Second, there is a need to build theory on how social ventures mobilize resources while 
advocating for different types of causes. Our article has begun to address this gap by demon-
strating how large-scale events can serve as a catalyst for social change in the area of learning 
disabilities. However, it would be reasonable to assume that the choice of advocacy tech-
niques would be affected by the intrinsic characteristics of a cause, such as its content and 
urgency of resolution. For example, Einstein (2012) highlights how “female-centric” causes 
related to topics such as children and health (e.g., curbing childhood obesity) are likely to 
face lesser challenges to mobilize support than non-female-centric and controversial causes 
(e.g., planned parenthood, gay marriage). Clearly, opportunities exist for multiple case stud-
ies that identify the similarities and differences between the approaches employed by social 
ventures to strike resonance with their target audience and successfully advocate for different 
causes.
Figure 1
Framework on Resource Mobilization Through Mutual Dependence by Social 
Ventures
Soft-power tactics used by focal actor 
Goal:
Coordinating 
contributions 
Tactics: 
- Guidance 
- Negotiation 
Goal:
Establishing 
control 
Tactics:
- Leverage 
- Cooptation
Goal:
Facilitating 
involvement
Tactics: 
- Appeal 
- Persuasion 
Outcomes Initial conditions 
Changes in attitudes 
towards social cause 
Successful event 
Changes in policy on 
social cause 
Low-profile cause with low 
urgency of resolution 
Social venture is a marginal 
actor with high resource needs 
Need to establish/manage 
relationships with various 
resource providers 
Opportunity to create shared 
value through a major event 
Soft power
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Third, there is merit in further exploring the role and relevance of events and community-
embedded initiatives and tactics to mobilize support from prospective resource providers. 
Our study pointed out how establishing emotional resonance with a cause, appealing to posi-
tive emotions, and providing partners with a chance to make a difference may facilitate 
resource mobilization. However, there is a need for additional theory on the role, sequence, 
and appropriateness of other types of appeals (e.g., guilt, shame) and how they affect the 
willingness of an external party to contribute to a social venture’s event or cause. The litera-
ture on impression management and rhetoric (e.g., Benford & Snow, 2000; Bolino, Kacmar, 
Turnley, & Gilstrap, 2008; Green, 2004) may provide insights on the use of different types of 
discourse. More generally, while geographic factors facilitated embeddedness to a cause in 
our study, future research could also empirically test the relevance of other dimensions of 
proximity to a cause (e.g., level of exposure to a cause, perceived relevance) and how they 
affect embeddedness.
Finally, we have begun to elaborate the role of soft power and soft control (Courpasson, 
2000; Nye, 1990; Santos & Eisenhardt, 2009) in helping social ventures establish and simul-
taneously manage relationships with multiple external parties. Barring exceptions, scholars 
seem to have overlooked this important aspect. Soft power emerged in our study as the key 
logic that facilitates mutual dependence, albeit one that might not be successful with all 
external parties across all situations. However, ample opportunities exist to further elaborate 
the types, applications, and constraints to the use of soft power in managing relationships 
with external parties. Such a focus on soft power promises to tease out the fine-grained 
dynamics of managing relationships, an area identified by Pfeffer and Salancik (2003) as 
needing further elaboration within resource dependence theory. Additionally, while much 
attention has been paid to what might be deemed less than virtuous uses of power (Pfeffer, 
1992), there is merit in exploring its more virtuous uses, such as its role in creating social 
value.
Implications for Practice and Policy
Our study has several implications for practice and policy. First, we draw attention to how 
social ventures would benefit from appealing to both the values and interests of prospective 
partners within the venture’s referent community. We also show the potential of community-
embedded events to serve as catalysts for shared economic and social value creation when 
they offer visibility to prospective resource providers and allow for carving niches for contri-
butions whereby resource providers can be clearly identified and linked to specific elements 
of the larger event. Second, and in contrast to looking at interactions with external parties 
either as disruptions that must be minimized or as one-time transactions, managers of social 
ventures would benefit from adopting a participatory style that allows for multiple ways to 
contribute. Third, our study highlights the benefits of using key events and crises as opportu-
nities to implement reforms and seek greater contributions from external parties. Fourth, we 
identify the importance of enlisting and showcasing the early support of visible organiza-
tions. We believe that this might be an effective way of encouraging bystanders to emulate 
the early supporters. Finally, our framework on soft power offers actionable insights into 
managing relationships, especially within horizontal arrangements where the use of hard 
power is not possible or effective.
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In addition to its relevance to social ventures and entrepreneurial firms, our findings have 
practical relevance to domains in which horizontal relationships are rife and collaborative 
activity commonplace. Three such domains include coproduction, public-private partner-
ships, and constrained cooperatives. First, the coproduction literature highlights the various 
ways in which a variety of external parties can cocreate value for a focal organization 
(Ramirez, 1999). Examples include open-source technologies, such as Linux, which benefit 
from mass contributions by software developers who do not know each other, and reality 
shows, such as American Idol and Britain’s Got Talent, which give voice to the community 
through their active calls for participation. Second, the state can play a role in social and 
economic as well as public-order “spaces.” In Europe, public-private partnership initiatives 
are being promoted as an efficient and effective method of achieving public good with lim-
ited state resources. Opportunities exist for resource-needy actors to use the soft-power tac-
tics described in our model to promote and implement their agendas. Third, constrained 
cooperatives may use soft-power tactics to rebalance economic relations between farmers, 
who strive to obtain higher prices for their produce and lower costs for their inputs, and the 
cooperative’s management, which needs to balance gains for farmer owners against the 
cooperative’s need to remain viable over time.
Notes
1. A 2001 survey by the Irish National Disability Authority (2002) revealed high levels of prejudice against 
people with learning disabilities, with only one in two people believing that these individuals should have similar 
access to employment as everyone else. Additionally, while the Paralympic Games receive support and contribu-
tions from the International Olympics Association, the Special Olympic Games do not.
2. Although it would have been interesting to include more information about the bidding process, this was not 
only beyond the scope of our study but also unfeasible for a number of reasons. First, this was a low-key process 
until the decision to host the Games in Ireland was taken and much of the bidding occurred behind the scenes. Thus, 
there were very few archival materials on this matter. Second, the real momentum and activities undertaken to orga-
nize the Games occurred only in the 2 years prior to their start date. Accordingly, we confine ourselves to presenting 
a detailed account of only those activities that were directly relevant to our research question.
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